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ABSTRACT  
In the post-Bitcoin era, many cryptocurrencies with a variety of goals and purposes have 
emerged in the digital arena. This paper aims to map cryptocurrency protocols across 
governance decentralization, security, and scalability, theorizing about the organizational and 
technological features that impact these dimensions. Such organizational and technology 
protocol features encompass roles permissiveness, validation network size, resource 
expenditure, and TPS (transaction per second). Based on these dimensions, we map the 
different cryptocurrency constellations based on their consensus mechanisms, illustrating how 
the various protocols applications experience and play with trade-offs among governance 
decentralization, security, and scalability. 
Index Terms²Cryptocurrency protocols, blockchain technology, decentralized 
governance, scalability, security. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite the hype around blockchain technology, the central attempts to understand relate to the 
technical aspects of the technology and its potential applications in the financial sector, as with 
the case of Bitcoin (Risius and Spohrer, 2017). However, as the technology evolved, a variety 
of distinct cryptocurrency protocols were born, sprouting new narratives and use-cases to the 
blockchain technology. In fact, since the creation of the cryptocurrency Bitcoin protocol in 
2008/2009, thousands of other cryptocurrencies have emerged (Evans, 2014; Corbet et al., 
2019) in the areas of micropayments, storage systems, intellectual property, financial and 
physical assets, supply chain and logistics, social networks, media, and open science, among 
other applications (Davidson, De Filippi, and Potts, 2018; Li et al., 2017).  
While new definitions, theoretical framings, and empirical evidence continue to grow, there 
is a strong need to distinguish between cryptocurrency protocols, their core technologies, 
currencies, and also what are the central distinguishing vectors among one another. This paper 
is, thus, an attempt to investigate theoretically such dimensions, proposing a systematic 
approach, which can explain why some cryptocurrency protocols are more decentralized, 
secure, or scalable than others. 
In the early days of Bitcoin, there was not much distinction between Bitcoin, the 
cryptocurrency protocol, and blockchain, the block-based timestamped distributed ledger that 
sustains Bitcoinʊthe Bitcoin database (Fani et al., 2019; Nakamoto, 2008). Indeed, the terms 
blockchain and cryptocurrency are still misused nowadays. However, in this paper, we make 
the distinction between cryptocurrency protocols and data infrastructure, arguing that the 
blockchain is only one type of distributed ledger infrastructure. While blockchain is widely 
adopted by most of the cryptocurrency protocols, it is not the only database structure, nor the 
sole attribute of cryptocurrency protocols. On the top of distributed ledger, cryptocurrency 
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protocols display other distinguishing components as cryptography, cryptocurrency incentives, 
and a distributed consensus mechanism. 
The intersection of these different technology components not only makes cryptocurrency 
protocols different from other existing protocols and currencies, such as digital, cryptographic, 
or even fiat currencies, but also allows cryptocurrencies to achieve inclusion, availability, 
divisibility, integrity, transparency, confidentiality, authenticity, and accountability (Biswas 
and Muthukkumarasamy, 2017; Corbet et al., 2019; Vigna and Casey 2015). In this paper, we 
define a cryptocurrency protocol as a system fueled by cryptocurrency incentives that allow 
nodes to transact in a peer-to-peer (P2P) network, following a particular consensus mechanism 
to reach agreement on the state of every cryptographically secured transaction of the distributed 
ledger (Catalini and Gans, 2017; Corbet et al., 2019; Davidson et al., 2018; Nakamoto, 2008; 
Pereira, Tavalaei, and Ozalp, 2019). 
Researchers and practitioners have discussed the specific dimensions of the protocols in 
distributed computing and blockchain, as is the case of %UHZHU¶V&$3WKHRUHPFRQVLVWHQF\
availability, and partition tolerance) on distributed computing, DQG(WKHUHXP¶V WULOHPPDon 
blockchain (decentralization, security, and scalability). This paper adds to the literature on 
cryptocurrencies by investigating the trilemma dimensions systematically, explaining how 
organizational and technological features, such as roles permissiveness, validation network 
size, resource expenditure, and TPS (transactions per second) affect governance 
decentralization, security, scalability, and inherent trade-offs.  
In the following sections of the paper, we discuss what a cryptocurrency protocol is and 
expand on its technological components. Afterwards, we detail the three 
dimensionsʊgovernance decentralization, security, and scalabilityʊDQG their respective 
features, suggesting some propositions for future research. Finally, we map the cryptocurrency 
constellations around the different consensus mechanisms and individual variations, 
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illustrating with examples, and we discuss the limitations of this study and suggestions for 
future research.  
II. CRYPTOCURRENCY PROTOCOLS 
Protocols are the rules, or the accepted standards, that define what an application can and 
cannot do within a set environment. Some widely known examples of protocols are HyperText 
Transfer Protocol (HTTP), which websites such as YouTube and Facebook obey, or Simple 
Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) and Post Office Protocol (POP3), used for the emails we 
exchange every day (see Liquid, 2018). As with these examples, cryptocurrencies also run over 
protocols that define the rules and standards of transactions. To a certain extent, cryptocurrency 
protocols obey a logic that is remarkably similar to that of previous internet protocols, like 
IPv4, IPv6, and HTTP, mainly in terms of their structure. Much like internet protocols, 
cryptocurrencies have a physical layer, a communication layer, and an interface layer (Biswas 
and Muthukkumarasamy, 2017). Therefore, each cryptocurrency project has its protocol, like 
Bitcoin, Ethereum, amongst others (Liquid, 2018).  
However, while cryptocurrency protocols share the same structure as other existing 
protocols, the technology of cryptocurrencies are fundamentally different, as cryptocurrency 
protocols emerge at the intersection of four various technological components, specifically 
cryptography, distributed ledgers, cryptocurrency incentives, and consensus mechanisms. 
While each of these components exists in other protocols and applications in isolation, 
cryptocurrency protocols present these four components simultaneously, which makes them 
different from other existing protocols, such as digital, cryptographic, or even fiat currencies. 
Cryptocurrency protocols use cryptography technology, which allows the sending of secure 
messages between two participants (P2P), where the sender sends an encrypted message, and 
the receiver needs to decrypt it to access the original message (Dinh et al., 2018). Additionally, 
these protocols also use PGP, or ³pretty-good-privacy´ encryption, which creates private-
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public addresses, allowing any user to prove that they are the owner of a piece of data without 
showing their master key (or password). Cryptocurrency protocols use both cryptography and 
antispam technologies to perform secure, anonymous (or pseudo-anonymous), and immutable 
transactions. Such technologies also contribute toward quick, efficient, and cost-effective 
auditing processes, and protection against double-spending (Dinh et al., 2018). 
Another core characteristic of cryptocurrency protocols is distributed ledger technology 
(DLT), that is a distributed data infrastructure where the posting of transactions writes data on 
the ledger (Dinh et al., 2018). &U\SWRFXUUHQF\SURWRFROV¶ledger of transactions, which records 
the history of all trades, is stored in many locations simultaneously in a distributed manner 
(Nakamoto, 2008). The distributed ledger reinforces immutability, efficient auditing of 
transactions, and improved tamper-proofing and reliability. There are some variants of 
distributed ledgers. The most famous is, of course, blockchain, which structures the data in 
timestamped blocks linked through a cryptographic hash (Fani et al., 2019). However, there 
are also other DLTs used in cryptocurrency protocols, such as Directed Acyclic Graphs 
(DAGs), or HashTree. 
Cryptocurrency protocols also integrate consensus mechanisms (Dinh et al., 2018), deeply 
connected to the distributed ledger. A consensus mechanism dictates the rules that validators 
and users must follow to participate in a network, building agreement among a network of 
mutually trustless participants. In essence, consensus mechanisms encompass the rules on how 
to add transactions to the ledger, allowing cryptocurrency protocols to run without the need for 
a trusted intermediary, as the consensus mechanism makes nodes agree on transaction data, 
such as amount, addresses, and accounts. The consensus mechanism is among the most 
defining dimensions of the cryptocurrency protocols, as it defines and interacts with the other 
cryptocurrency protocol components, such as cryptography, the distributed ledger, and 
cryptocurrency incentives. The most widely known consensus mechanisms are Proof-of-Work 
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(PoW), Proof-of-Stake (PoS), and Delegated Byzantine Fault Tolerance (DBFT) (Wang et al., 
2020). 
The last but no less critical defining characteristic of cryptocurrency protocols is the 
cryptocurrency incentives. Cryptocurrency incentives are fungible and tradable assets 
exchangeable within the platform to buy complements or convert into other cryptocurrencies 
or fiat currencies (such as USD or EUR) outside the focal venue. Cryptocurrency incentive 
schemes provide a reward to people providing labour, computing power, or other resources 
when recording and verifying transactions, or even voting on governance (Evans, 2014). The 
cryptocurrency incentives schemes serve to attract participants to register, validate, vote, or 
even perform transactions, fostering a decentralized coordination among participants. In other 
words, cryptocurrency incentive systems elicit efforts from a distributed global workforce to 
verify and record transactions on the ledger without the need for a central authority to control 
and validate transactions (Evans, 2014). 
In short, a cryptocurrency protocol is a system fueled by cryptocurrency incentives that 
allow nodes to transact in a peer-to-peer (P2P) network, following a particular consensus 
mechanism to reach agreement on the state of every cryptographically secured transaction of 
the distributed ledger (Catalini and Gans, 2017; Corbet et al., 2019; Davidson et al., 2018; 
Nakamoto, 2008; Pereira et al., 2019) (see Table I). 
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TABLE I 
CRYPTOCURRENCY PROTOCOLS¶ DISTINGUISHING COMPONENTS 
 
Components Network Objectives Supporting technology 
Cryptography Security; anonymity (or pseudo-anonymity); 
immutability; auditing process 
Public key cryptography, 
PGP, hashing 
Distributed ledger Immutability, auditability, tamperproof, and 
reliability 
Blockchain technology, 
HashTree, Directed Acyclic 
Graphs (DAGs) 
Consensus 
mechanisms 
Consistency, liveliness, fault tolerance, 
protection against double-spending 
PoW, PoS, DBFT, among 
others. 
Cryptocurrency 
incentives 
Participation, coordination, decentralization Tokens, cryptocurrencies 
 
III. KEY DIMENSIONS OF CRYPTOCURRENCY PROTOCOLS 
Around 30 years ago, Eric Brewer introduced the CAP theorem of distributed computing. Such 
theorem states that network shared data-systems can only provide simultaneously two out of 
the following three dimensions: consistency (the ability of servers to return the right response 
to each request), availability (the degree to which each request receives a response), and 
partition tolerance (the ability of the servers to perform even considering delayed and lost 
messages between servers) (Brewer, 2000). Recently, the Ethereum team adapted such theorem 
in light of blockchain protocols, arguing that blockchain-based protocols can only deliver two 
RI WKH WULOHPPD¶V GLPHQVLRQV: governance decentralization (degree of transactions 
disintermediation) (Bohme et al., 2015; Davidson et al., 2018), security (network resilience, 
fault-tolerance, and immutability when facing attacks), and/or scalability (ability to handle a 
growing number of transactions) (Ethereum, 2019; see also Cholan, 2019; Fani et al., 2019; 
Manoppo, 2018). We build on the (WKHUHXP¶V scalability trilemma, conceptualizing these 
dimensions as continuous, such that a cryptocurrency protocol could potentially be at any point 
along each dimension. Also, we theorize on the organizational and technological features that 
influence each extent. For the sake of brevity, in our propositions, we focus on the five main 
features of the cryptocurrency protocols: roles permissiveness, validation network size, 
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resource expenditure, and TPS (transactions per second). We ignore other technology 
dimensions such as communications protocols (Whisper), oracles, like Chainlink and peer-to-
peer version-controlled file system, also known as decentralized storage protocols (IPFS) (see 
Chen et al., 2017). 
A. Governance Decentralization 
Governance decentralization is among the essential characteristics and values enacted by the 
cryptocurrency community (Bohme et al., 2015; Davidson et al., 2018; Mingxiao et al., 2017; 
Raskin 2013), which in fact advocates for more democratic digital ordering. Governance refers 
to the structure that supports transactions inside an organization, indicating the framework 
within which transactions are conducted (Williamson, 1979). Other researchers have 
LQWHUSUHWHG FU\SWRFXUUHQFLHV JRYHUQDQFH DV ³FRQVWLWXWLRQDO´ Uegimes, which encompass the 
rules and the rules about making rules (Alston, 2019; Berg, Berg, and Novak, 2020). 
Governance decentralization in cryptocurrency protocols reflects the degree to which the 
actions of and transactions between agents are possible and practical without the control or 
authorization of a reduced group of individuals (Benkler, 2010). While the current wave of 
cryptocurrency protocols tend to be overall more decentralized than other currencies (e.g. fiat, 
cryptographic, or virtual currencies) (Chaum, 1983; European Central Bank, 2012); inside the 
cryptocurrencies sphere, there are different degrees of decentralization. Three dimensions may 
affect cryptocurrencies¶ governance decentralization level, which are roles permissiveness, 
validation network size, and resource expenditure.  
Inside cryptocurrency protocols, there are three prominent roles: users, developers, and 
validators. Users conduct transactions and store value within the network (Pereira et al., 2019). 
Developers have the technical ability to maintain the underlying code and to suggest code 
amends and upgrades, defining the future directions of the project (Berg et al., 2020; Pereira et 
al., 2019). Validators record and verify transactions, obeying to a specific consensus 
9 
 
mechanism. Some researchers see developers and validators as belonging to the same group 
(Alston, 2019). These two groups overlap as validators tend to have technical and functional 
knowledge about the protocols, voting, proposing, debating, accepting, or rejecting suggestions 
to upgrade the code, being often developers (Pereira et al., 2019; Berg et al., 2020). Therefore, 
these two groups of participants perform governance functions on behalf of users. Their 
decisions affect core definitions of the protocol, the validation process, the incentives of 
network participants, and the comparative ability of a given blockchain to achieve its network 
objectives (Alston, 2019). In this paper, we suggest that the level of decentralization of a 
protocol depends on the degree to which each role is permissionless. 
High governance decentralization means that the tasks of decision-making and transaction 
performance, recording, and validation belong to many participants across the network. In these 
open, permissionless networks, anyone can join the network to make P2P transactions, which 
are validated by an independent pool of validators, who follow a consensus mechanism that 
allows reaching agreement on transactions (Davidson et al., 2018). Additionally, the 
community of developers can also suggest and vote on amendments to the code and new 
updates, or even fork the code, since these cryptocurrency protocols also tend to be open source. 
Cryptocurrency incentives fuel participation and coordination, securing the maintenance of the 
platform without the need for a third party to verify and record transactions and to maintain 
and take decisions about the future of the project (Davidson et al., 2018). Such a level of 
governance decentralization follows 1DNDPRWR¶V Bitcoin ideal of creating a permissionless 
network, which everyone can join to perform transactions, validate them, or update and change 
the code (Böhme et al., 2015; Nakamoto, 2008).  
Low governance decentralization means that there is a group of authorized nodes in the 
network responsible for decision-making, transaction performance, and/or recording and 
validation. Cryptocurrency protocols that encompass delegated Byzantine fault-tolerant 
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(DBFT) consensus mechanisms, and similar variants, tend to present a few central nodes that 
³FRQWURO´WKHQHWZRUN (Crain et al., 2018). Such control can be exerted at transaction validation, 
data recording, and decision-making levels. One application example is NEO, a blockchain-
based platform that aims to HQKDQFHWKH³VPDUWHFRQRP\´1(2:KLWHSDSHU. In this 
project, a voting mechanism picks the validators (Neo Developer Guide, 2020; EOS Developer 
Guide, 2020), and only a group of authorized nodes in the network are responsible for recording 
and validating transactions. Additionally, the decision-making is also centralized in the NEO 
foundation (NEO, 2019). 
In this paper, we build the argument that the degree of permissiveness across developers, 
users, and validators rolesʊwhether the roles are open to everyone or restricted to a defined 
groupʊis one of the features that help to determine the level of governance decentralization of 
a protocol. Therefore, the higher the number of permissionless roles, the higher the level of 
decentralization in cryptocurrency protocols.  
P1a. Cryptocurrency protocols that display permissionless roles across users, 
validators, and developers tend to have a higher governance decentralization than 
cryptocurrency protocols that present permissioned functions for users, validators, 
and/or developers.  
While the number of permissionless roles constitutes a good proxy of governance 
decentralization, it is meaningless if the validation network is relatively small and/or if a small 
number of nodes concentrates the validation and data storage processes (Wang et al., 2019). 
Validators, who record and verify transactions obeying a specific consensus mechanism, are 
essential as they replace a centralized actor in validating transactions and storing data (Pereira 
et al., 2019). There are three main reasons behind centralized validation networks.  First, the 
validation roles are restricted to a select group of nodes. Second, the number of validation 
nodes is small in the consensus protocol despite being permissionless. Third, because despite 
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displaying permissionless and unrestricted numbers of validation nodes, there are accessibility 
issues due to high resource expenditure that can function as a barrier to entry (see proposition 
P1c). For whatever reason, if the group of validators is relatively small, such a network would 
be similar centralized governance modes.  
The main risk of having a reduced validation network is the concentration of power around 
few validation nodes that can collude, alter the state of the network, or block certain 
transactions or addresses, resembling centralized governance systems (see Benkler, 2010). 
Such misbehaviours are less likely to occur in more extensive validation networks, as it is more 
difficult for a larger group of validators to agree and coordinate to misbehave. Therefore, 
cryptocurrency projects that present wider validation networks are more decentralized than 
those that display smaller validation networks. Two opposing examples are Stellar, a DBFT 
protocol, which has around 73 validation nodes (Stellarbeat.io, 2019), and Bitcoin, a PoW 
(Proof-of-Work) protocol, which validation network encompasses about 10.000 validation 
nodes (Bitcoin, 2019). 
P1b. Cryptocurrency protocols that present more extensive validation networks tend to 
be more decentralized than cryptocurrency protocols that display smaller validation 
networks.  
Beyond the number of permissionless roles and the network size of validation nodes, the 
number of nodes is also determinant for the level of decentralization of any cryptocurrency 
protocol. If the groups of users, validators, or developers are relatively small, despite being 
permissionless and anyone being able to participate, control would be centralized in this small 
group, resembling centralized governance modes. An important factor that can contribute to 
raising barriers to entry in a network is resource expenditure, which relates to the resources 
spent to access, update, perform, record, or validates transactions. Resource expenditure 
encompasses requirements in terms of specialized hardware or complicated software to 
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perform, record, or validate transactions (Gipp et al., 2015), and also computational power (i.e. 
electricity used to validate transactions and data storage) (Gipp et al., 2015) or staking power 
(amount of tokens/coins) to validate transactions. Low resource expenditure reduces barriers 
to entry, allowing more members to join the network, and bigger networks tend to be more 
decentralized than smaller networks, ceteris paribus. 
The cryptocurrency projects that encompass PoS (Proof-of-Stake) are an excellent example 
of cryptocurrency protocols that enhance decentralization through their potential to attract large 
networks due to their low resource expenditure. However, while PoS consensus mechanism 
does not require specialized hardware or complicated software to perform, record, or validate 
transactions, they do require staking power, demanding participants to stake some of their 
tokens to become validators. Nevertheless, even if the stakes needed to validate a transaction 
are very high, staking power is a resource intrinsic to the network, as staking require owning 
tokens/coins that store value on itself. For this reason, PoS based cryptocurrency protocols have 
the highest potential to score high in governance decentralization, despite not being the most 
adopted protocol at the date of writing and no application case has yet achieved a network size 
bigger than Bitcoin, for example. Nevertheless, we argue that PoS application protocols would 
tend to attract more extensive networks theoretically. 
On the other extreme, there are PoW protocols, which require specific hardware, and 
computational power (high resource expenditure) which is a resource extrinsic to the protocol, 
being burned in the process of transaction validation. For example, Bitcoin, a PoW protocol, 
requires ASIC machines, which are expensive, and requires high-energy consumption for 
transaction validation, scoring high on resource expenditure. This example highlights that 
despite displaying permissionless roles and being designed to be decentralized, the reality is 
that validation roles are not easy to access in Bitcoin protocol and mining power concentrates 
in a few large mining pools (Romiti et al., 2019).  Still, Bitcoin is among the existing protocols 
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the more decentralized one due to its age, relative high adoption, and big validation network, 
however, the increased resource expenditure may prevent this network of reaching fully 
decentralized governance.  
P1c. Cryptocurrency protocols that display low resource expenditure tend to be more 
decentralized than cryptocurrency protocols that present high resource expenditure.   
B. Security 
The security aspect of cryptocurrency protocols is a significant area of research, as security is 
essential to any protocol that wants to guarantee the disintermediation of transactions. A secure 
protocol needs to be fault-tolerant, resilient, and immutable. While fault-tolerance is the ability 
to survive to several failures before a disconnection (Najjar and Gaudiot, 1990); resilience is 
the capability of the application to recover to an acceptable operational condition after it faces 
an event, such an attack (Infosys, 2019). Finally, immutability entails that the current or 
previous state of the distributed ledger cannot be modified once created.  
There are two main general types of attacks against cryptocurrency protocols: spam and 
³DWWDFNV´, which may have short or long-range1. Short-range attacks encompass Spam 
attacks, like DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) and DNS (Domain name system) attacks, 
which happen when a targeted server is flooded with superfluous requests to purposefully 
overload the system and prevent the provision of regular service to other users, exploring the 
vulnerabilities of the server. Several exchanges of Bitcoin and Ethereum (PoW based 
cryptocurrency protocols) suffer from DDoS attacks and DNS attacks frequently, hampering 
the service available to users. For instance, with Bitcoin, such attacks can cause a devaluation 
of the cryptocurrency, loss of mining rewards, or even closure of cryptocurrency exchanges 
                                                 
1
 For our analysis, we ignore social attacks, such as phishing, malware, or direct wallet hacks. Social attack vectors 
will always exist, as long as there is a password and, therefore, an incentive to the attacker to steal that password. 
Social attacks are not protocol-specific, meaning that such attacks may happen independently of the technology 
or protocol. 
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(Saad et al., 2019). Another type of frequently discussed attacks and potentially the most 
harmful long-range attacks to cryptocurrency protocols are ³DWWDFNV´. Such attacks happen 
when validators can reverse transactions and initiate double-spending, which means that they 
would be able to spend the same coin multiple times. Such attacks can also entangle exclusion 
and modification of the order of the transactions; selectively withholding mined blocks and 
only gradually publishing them (selfish mining); provision of contradicting block and 
transaction information to different blockchain network nodes (eclipse attacks), hampering the 
normal mining operations of other miners (Li et al., 2017; Gervais et al., 2017). So far, 
cryptocurrencies such as Ethereum Classic, a hard fork of the Ethereum protocol, or Vertcoin, 
an alternative implementation of the Bitcoin protocol focusing on increased privacy, both have 
been successfully 51% attacked, more than once (Coindesk, 2020).  
For a cryptocurrency protocol to be secure, it should guarantee both network fault-tolerance 
and resilience to be short and long-range attacks, preserving the immutability of the distributed 
ledger in the long-range (see Kewell et al., 2017; Najjar and Gaudiot, 1990). There are 
technology and organizational features that can affect cryptocurrency protocols security, which 
is resources expenditure (computational power and staking power), TPS (number of 
transactions per second), and validation network size.  
Resource expenditure in transaction validation in one of the factors that may affect 
protocols¶ fault-tolerance and resilience to ³ attacks´ that can compromise the 
immutability of the protocol in the long run. Resource expenditure may encompass the 
resources needed to validate and store transactions in a network, entangling both computational 
powers (energy/electricity spend to validate and store transactions) or staking power (amount 
of tokens/coins needed to be at stake to validate transactions). As validators may need to spend 
resources to validate transactions, if they intend to attack the network, they would need to 
control more than (at least) 51% of the validation resources of the network. Therefore, higher 
15 
 
the resource expenditure to validate transactions, more difficult is to actors to control 51% of 
the network, and higher tend to be the fault-tolerance and resilience of the protocol and, 
therefore, higher the security.  
PoW based cryptocurrency protocols, for example, are based on cryptographic calculations 
that make miners spend energy to solve computational problems to find a hash that links all 
blocks in the blockchain. To perform a ³DWWDFN´ in PoW protocols, validation nodes need 
to control 51% of the hashing power. This means that, if the attacker wants to keep mining on 
the orphan chain, they need to continuously spend energy to maintain control to be selected 
over and over again to create a block to be accepted as valid on the main chain. Such energy 
expenditure is continuous, which can easily reach prohibitive levels. Therefore, since attackers 
cannot sustain the attack indefinitely due to resource investment, PoW based protocols tend to 
display a higher resilience and fault-tolerance when compared with other similar networks that 
endorse different protocols (e.g. DBFT or PoS). An example of PoW application protocol is 
Bitcoin, which resource expenditure in terms of computational power (energy/electricity) is 
one of the highest of the cryptocurrency sphere, being simultaneously one of the most secure 
and resilient to ³51% attacks´, as such would achieve prohibitive values. One of the most 
significant criticisms to Bitcoin concerns the amount of energy spent to maintain and run the 
protocol (O'Dwyer and Malone, 2014).    
Another way to validate transactions in cryptocurrency protocols is by using staking power, 
as is the case of PoS protocols. Even though no double-spend attack has ever been successful 
in this type of protocol up to this date, we argue that the long-term impact of a hypothetical 
successful attack could be devastating. In the PoS case, there is no high-energy expenditure; 
however, there is a need for staking power. The vulnerability of PoS protocols relates to how 
much stake is needed to validate transactions and the amount of investment required to acquire 
such tokens/coins to control the network. Still, suppose an attacker holds more than 51% 
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tokens/coins in a PoS protocol. In that case, there is no way to exclude the attacker from the 
network, and staking power will forever be tilted in one direction unless the protocol excludes 
the attacker's coins from the network (hard fork). Additionally, this expenditure to maintain the 
attack through acquiring 51% of staking power is only incurred once, not continuously like in 
PoW protocols. Theoretically, if a PoS protocol is attacked successfully, a hard-fork would be 
required to fix it, at the expense of the immutability of the ledger; while in PoW, the attacker 
eventually would run out of resources.  
DBFT protocols are among the most adopted protocols. These federated protocols are more 
straightforward to attack due to the low resources expenditure to store and validate transactions. 
In DBFT protocols, validation is reached through an agreement among several central authority 
nodes. In this case, the resource expenditure is considerably low and staking power is not 
required as well; therefore, attacks are more likely to happen. Hypothetically, suppose a DBFT 
validation network has few validation nodes. In that case, the possibility that few nodes collude 
and control 51% of the network is real, and the colluding nodes could potentially create 
additional currency, access to private data, hack private keys, and censor transactions given 
they control the majority of the network. We, then, argue that protocols that require higher 
resource expenditure tend to be more fault-tolerant and resilient to 51% attached, being, 
therefore, more secure than protocols that have low resource expenditure requirements.  
P2a. Cryptocurrency protocols that require higher resource expenditure to validate 
transactions tend to display higher security, then cryptocurrency protocols that require 
lower resource expenditure. 
&U\SWRFXUUHQFLHV¶TPS (number of transactions per second that a protocol can perform on 
average) can also play a significant role in dictating how resilient and fault-tolerant a protocol 
is against spam and 51% attacks. Such attacks are possible because decentralized network 
nodes tend to be asynchronous, meaning that information might take some time to arrive from 
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one node to another (Crain et al., 2018). This time-lapse, also called propagation delay, can 
lead to the situation that during the validating process, two or more coinciding blocks can be 
created at the same time, originating a parallel chain of blocks (aka orphaned blocks). As long 
as more than one chain is valid, different nodes may accept different versions of the blockchain, 
and it becomes harder for a new node to know the "truth" of the ledger. The existence of 
orphaned blocks may increase the likelihood that transactions are lost or/and double-spend and 
³51% attacks´ may happen. Eventually, the orphaned blockchain will be void and transactions 
cancelled. Nevertheless, such events affect the immutability of the ledger and users' 
confidence, destroying the value of timestamped transactions, the faith of the users, and the 
security of the network.  
TPS can be enhanced by increasing the block weight or decreasing the block-time. Block 
weight encompasses the size of the block in terms of bytes and bits. Each transaction performed 
under a cryptocurrency protocol has a specific size in bytes and bits. As a reference point, 
Bitcoin transactions size may vary between 225 bytes and a maximum of 4 MB (Nakamoto, 
2008). Block-time corresponds to how much time it takes a block to be added to the chain of 
blocks (blockchain). For example, the Bitcoin protocol requires, on average, 10 minutes for a 
partnership to be created and added to the blockchain (Nakamoto, 2008). On the one hand, the 
bigger the block weight, the longer the block confirmation period, and higher the time-lapse 
(or propagation delay), which increases the likelihood of orphaned blocks and ³ attacks´. 
On the other hand, the shorter the block-time, more often, the information is sent to the nodes, 
being WKHQRGHV¶V\QFKURQL]DWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWVKLJKHUOHDGLQJagain to propagation delays and 
synchronizing issues.  
A much-discussed potential solution for Bitcoin's (PoW protocol) low TPS (7 transactions 
per second) is to increase the size of its blocks. Unfortunately, as explained, this solution leads 
to higher propagation delays, which again increases the probability of orphaned blocks and the 
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risk of attacks (Kokoris-Kogias et al., 2016). Contrasting examples are NEO (a DBFT 
application) and EOS (delegated PoS protocol), which display higher TPS. For reference, NEO 
can produce up to 10,000 TPS, whereas EOS close to 4,000 (NEO Developer Guide, 2020; 
EOS Developer Guide, 2020). Both protocols theoretically possess a higher risk of creating 
orphan blocks and of suffering from ³ attacks´. As exposed, increasing TPS may entail 
propagation delays and synchronization issues, which may lead to orphan blocks and 
consequently increase the likelihood of 51% attacks, reducing the security of the protocol. 
P2b. Cryptocurrency protocols that display lower TPS (transactions per second) tend 
to be more secure than cryptocurrency protocols that present higher TPS. 
The size of the validation network influences not only governance decentralization but also 
WKHSURWRFRO¶VVHFXULW\DQGWKHprobability of a successful attack on the network. One of the 
main concerns of the cryptocurrency community regarding security is that a node or a group of 
colluded nodes control over 51% of the validation power of the network, as such an entity could 
effectively control the system by sustaining the longest chain and conduct ³DWWDFNV´ (Li 
et al., 2017; Gervais et al., 2017). In this paper, we argue that in cryptocurrency protocols that 
display more extensive validation networks (Croman et al., 2016), the validation power will be 
more distributed, decreasing the likelihood that a single node or collusion of nodes attack the 
network, thus improving the overall security of the protocol. An example worth mentioning is 
EOS, the delegated PoS based blockchain protocol that suffered a validator collusion attack 
(Cointelegraph, 2018). The claimants accused the EOS block producers, the entities 
responsible for minting blocks, of colluding with one another by mutual voting. Such type of 
colluding behaviour that endangers the security of the network is more likely to happen in 
smaller than bigger validation networks. 
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P2c. Cryptocurrency protocols that display more extensive validation networks tend to 
be more secure than cryptocurrency protocols that communicate smaller validation 
networks. 
C. Scalability 
Scalability represents the capability of a network to handle a growing amount of work or its 
potential to be enlarged to accommodate that growth (Ethereum, 2019). Scalability entangles 
three main dimensions: transaction volume, speed, and scope. Transaction volume refers to a 
network capacity to increase the number of outputs, maintaining the same number of inputs. 
Transaction processing speed is the capacity for a particular network of nodes to process more 
inputs during the same period. Speed augments as the faster processing time for the same set 
of transactions given the same network inputs per transaction. Finally, transaction scope is the 
network capacity to process the same number of information with additional data parameters 
to increase the overall network functionality (Investopedia, 2020; Grayblock, 2018). A system 
is considered scalable if it is capable of increasing its total output under an increased load when 
resources (typically hardware) are added; if it can process more inputs per second; or if it can 
produce additional functionality as an output, per the same number of inputs. TPS and 
validation network size are features that have implications for scalability. 
&U\SWRFXUUHQF\ SURWRFROV¶ 736 has a direct impact on the scalability potential of the 
network. Protocols that display higher TPS can conduct more transactions per second, what is 
relevant when such protocols ambition to be worldwide adopted. To increase TPS, one might 
raise the block weight of decrease the block-time. Larger blocks are likely to contain a higher 
number of transactions, and shorter block-time is expected to accelerate the number of blocks 
produced, increasing the numbers of transactions validated per second. Cryptocurrency 
protocols may display different block weight and time, and even some variations in terms of 
fees, and the absence of strict block weight or time, therefore, the best comparison measure is 
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indeed TPS.  Regarding existing protocols, one extreme encompasses PoW protocols, such as 
Bitcoin, which currently can perform seven transactions-per-second on average (Nakamoto, 
2008), and Ethereum, which display around nine transactions-per-second; on the other extreme, 
DBFT protocols, such as  Stellar and Neo can do a maximum of ~10,000 transactions-per-
second (Mazieres, 2016; NEO Whitepaper, 2019), having the higher potential for scalability.  
P3a. Cryptocurrency protocols that display higher TPS tend to be more scalable than 
cryptocurrency protocols that have lower TPS. 
&U\SWRFXUUHQF\SURWRFROV¶GLVWULEXWHG OHGJHUV require that every validation node keeps a 
complete or partial copy of the ledger data locally, forming a distributed ledger. However, as 
the number of users increase and consequently, the number of transactions, the amount of data 
transmitted via network bandwidth and stored on node devices increases. Keeping and 
maintaining such large amounts of data synchronized at every node of an extensive validation 
network is a bottleneck for the network growth. Additionally, messages and transactions are 
delivered in a flood fashion, which means that devices must be woken up frequently to process 
received events, thereby increasing battery consumption dramatically (Wei-hong et al., 2017). 
The limitations in terms of network bandwidth, data storage, and energy consumption, which 
may increase propagation delays, LQHYLWDEO\RIIHUFKDOOHQJHVWRSURWRFROV¶VFDODELOLW\ 
One possible way to address propagation delay issues to increase scalability is by decreasing 
the number of nodes participating in the validation network. The smaller the number of nodes, 
the faster is the synchronization among them, and higher is the network ability to scale. The 
reduction of the validation network to increase scalability is often achieved through delegation 
of validation power to a small group of validators or through the creation of permissioned nodes 
that validate and store transactions. For example, Stellar a DBFT protocol can process between 
1000 and 10,000 TPS, being a reasonably scalable protocol. However, the validation network 
has only  70 validation nodes that are vetted institutions only (Stellarbeat.io, 2019). 
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P3b. Cryptocurrency protocols that display smaller validation networks tend to be 
more scalable than cryptocurrency protocols that have larger validation networks. 
IV. CRYPTOCURRENCY PROTOCOL CONSTELLATIONS 
The different cryptocurrency protocols share a number of characteristics, such as cryptography, 
cryptocurrency incentives, distributed ledgers, and consensus mechanisms that distinguish 
them from other protocols and from other digital currencies; however, inside the universe of 
cryptocurrency protocols, there are significant differences across governance decentralization, 
security, and scalability. As exposed throughout our propositions, organizational and 
technological features as roles permissiveness, validation network size, resource expenditure, 
and TPS can have opposing effects on governance decentralization, security, and scalability, 
creating trade-offs among these three fundamental dimensions. For example, while larger 
validation networks positively influence governance decentralization and security, it has a 
negative influence on scalability. Similarly, a high resource expenditure increases security but 
decreases governance decentralization, and a high TPS increases scalability but decreases 
security. These inherent trade-offs make difficult or nearly impossible, considering the current 
state of the technology, for a protocol to be decentralized, secure, and scalable at the same time. 
Whether a cryptocurrency will achieve more decentralization, security or scalability is partially 
defined by its consensus mechanism, which dictates the rules that validators and users must 
follow to participate in the network, building agreement among a network of mutually trustless 
participants. Consensus mechanisms are, therefore, the most defining element of 
cryptocurrency protocols.  
At this date, three main consensus protocols have been implemented in cryptocurrency 
projects: PoW, PoS, and DBFT (Shijie and Lee, 2019)2. However, it is important to note that, 
                                                 
2
 :HXVHGWKHWHUP³PDLQFRQVHQVXVPHFKDQLVP´WRGHVFULEHWKHPRVWZLGHO\DGRSWHGSURWRFROLPSOHPHQWDWLRQV
Looking at the top-10 cryptocurrencies, around 50% are PoW, while 30% are PoS, and the remaining 20% are 
DBFT (Coinmarketcap, 2020-March, 2020). 
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while some cryptocurrency projects instantiate pure versions of these consensus mechanisms, 
others integrate variations across roles permissiveness, validation network size, resource 
expenditure, and TPS. As an analogy, we discuss three constellations of cryptocurrency 
projects (PoW, PoS, and DBFT), in which each constellation represent a group of projects that 
share the same consensus mechanism, as constellations of stars share the nearby space. Then, 
we mapped the constellations of cryptocurrency projects in the three-dimensional space of 
governance decentralization, security, and scalability (see Figure 1 and Table 2), applying the 
propositions proposed previously and discussing how each protocol and project manage the 
trade-offs.  
 
 
FIGURE I 
CRYPTOCURRENCY PROTOCOLS CONSTELLATIONS 
 
Bubble sizes represent adjusted market capitalization (data from November 2019). PoW 
constellation: Bitcoin, Ethereum, BitcoinCash; PoS constellation: Dash, Ardor, EOS; DBFT 
constellation: Ripple, NEO, Stellar 
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TABLE 2 
CRYPTOCURRENCY PROTOCOLS DATA 
 
Market cap                 
($, billions)*  
Consensus 
mechanism 
Network size in 
validation nodes TPS 
Bitcoin 170.0 PoW 9354 7 
Ethereum 20.0 PoW 6711 9.3 
Bitcoin Cash 5.0 PoW 1453 110 
Ardor 0.1 PoS 131 110 
Dash 0.6 PoS 4430 34 
EOS 3.0 PoS 21 3996 
Ripple 13.0 DBFT 1011 1500 
Stellar 1.2 DBFT 73 1000-10000 
Neo 0.7 DBFT 7 1000-10000 
*Values of November (CoinMarketCap, 2019-block explorers) 
A. PoW Constellations  
PoW is a consensus mechanism based on cryptographic calculations that make miners spend 
energy to solve computational problems, in order to find a hash that links all blocks in the 
blockchain (Fani et al., 2019). PoW protocols require resource expenditure, specifically 
computational power, as energy needs to be spent to validate transactions. In a case of a 51% 
attack on the network, the attacker needs to spend a prohibitive amount of energy to keep the 
orphaned block, which can reach prohibitive levels (Nakamoto, 2008; Biswas and 
Muthukkumarasamy, 2017) (see P2a). Therefore, among the three main consensus 
mechanisms, PoW is the one that favours security the most. In the following paragraphs, we 
will describe cryptocurrency protocols that include PoW, which are Bitcoin, Ethereum, and 
BitcoinCash (see Figure 1). 
Bitcoin: Bitcoin was designed to be used as digital cash and gold, and it is the oldest and first 
implementation of a fully working PoW system, based on the SHA256 encryption algorithm 
(Nakamoto, 2008).  
Bitcoin presents permissionless roles across users, validators, and developers (P1a), and a 
large validation network with 9350 validation nodes (P1b) (Blockchair, 2019), scoring high in 
governance decentralization. However, Bitcoin also scores high in resource expenditure (P1c), 
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which prevents it from realizing its full decentralization potential. Since 2013, Bitcoin miners 
(validators) began to use computers designed specifically for mining cryptocurrency as 
efficiently as possible (called ASICs), which are expensive and need to be upgraded often. In 
addition, validators also need to spend a high amount of energy to solve computational 
problems to find a hash that links all blocks in the blockchain (Fani et al., 2019) to validate 
blocks of transactions. DHVSLWH %LWFRLQ ZDV LQLWLDOO\ GHVLJQHG WR EH ³WKH GHFHQWUDOL]HG´
network, the high resource expenditure (see P1c) has created an inverse incentive, resulting on 
some level of concentration of validation power in big mining pools (Romiti et al., 2019). 
Nevertheless, age, wide adoption, permissionless roles and validation network size reinforces 
%LWFRLQ¶VJRYHUQDQFHGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQPDNLQJ LWRQHRI WKHPRVWGHFHQWUDOL]HGSURWRFROV in 
existence. 
Bitcoin also scores high in security due to high resources expenditure (P2a), low TPS of 
around 7 (Nakamoto, 2008) (P2b), and relatively large validation network (see P2c). As 
explained previously, cryptocurrency protocols with lower TPS (smaller block size and longer 
block time) tend to be more secure, as the long block time allows nodes to synchronize the 
information on transactions and ledger state each time a block is produced, minimizing 
propagation delay issues. Additionally, Bitcoin currently possesses a high hash rate. The higher 
the hash rate, the higher is the resource expenditure, the more difficult it is to perform and 
maintain a 51% attack. All these factors explain why Bitcoin is one of the most secure of the 
cryptocurrency protocols. Alternatively, Bitcoin is one of the least scalable protocols 
displaying small TPS (block weight of around 1.2 MB, and block time around 10 minutes) 
(Nakamoto, 2008) (P3a). In the Bitcoin case, security and decentralization are achieved at the 
expense of scalability (Fani et al., 2019).  
Ethereum: Ethereum was one of the first ICOs (initial coin offerings) in the cryptocurrency 
space that took place during 2015. The goal of this cryptocurrency is to become the first 
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decentralized world computer, meaning that any user can deploy dApps or decentralized 
applications over the Ethereum protocol by paying a fee in its native blockchain 
cryptocurrency, Ether (Ethereum, 2019; Liquid, 2018). 
Much like its peer Bitcoin, Ethereum also scores relatively high in decentralization as it 
possesses permissionless roles (P1a) and a large validation network of 6500 nodes (Blockchair, 
2019) (P1b), making it the second most decentralized network. While Ethereum does not 
require particular hardware to operate, being ³*38-friendly,´validators still need to spend 
energy to validate transactions (Ethereum, 2019) (see P1c). This has been an issue to improve 
the decentralization of the project and one of the main reasons motivating the transition of 
Ethereum from PoW to PoS since in PoS, the validation process is through staking tokens3.  
Currently, Ethereum presents a relatively low TPS (between 9 and 50) (Etherscan, 2019; 
Ethereum, 2019) (P2b); however, it presents a lower resource expenditure than Bitcoin, as its 
hashing power is lower, which makes it easier to attack the network and compromise its 
security (P2a). It is estimated that the cost of attacking Ethereum through 51% attacks would 
be around half the cost of attacking Bitcoin (Exaking, 2019), making it less secure than Bitcoin, 
but still one of the most secure cryptocurrencies in the space. Much like Bitcoin, in Ethereum, 
security and decentralization are achieved at the expense of scalability.  
Bitcoin Cash: Bitcoin Cash (BCH) is an alternative cryptocurrency, or altcoin, created in mid-
2017 from a hard fork of Bitcoin. Increased fees on the Bitcoin network in December 2017 
induced some in the Bitcoin community to enable BCH, which runs on SHA256; however, it 
presents an increased block weight (Bitcoin Cash, 2019). 
Much like with other PoW protocols, the governance roles of BCH are permissionless (P1a), 
and its validation network encompasses 1400 validating nodes (Blockchair, 2019) (P1b). BCH 
                                                 
3
 At the moment of writing, Ethereum community is planning to transition from PoW to PoS consensus. Still, it 
will keep running a PoW protocol for the foreseeable future (Ethereum, 2020).   
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also display high resource expenditures, as it requires ASIC hardware (P1c). Hence, Bitcoin 
Cash is less decentralized than previous PoW protocols, mainly due to smaller validation 
networks, lagging behind both Ethereum and Bitcoin. Bitcoin Cash can perform 110 TPS 
(Bitcoin Cash, 2019), a bit higher than the other PoW protocols. This increase in block size 
potentially leads to network latency problems, making Bitcoin Cashless secure than the other 
PoW protocols presented in this paper (P2b). Another factor that has contributed to Bitcoin 
Cash's lower security is its hash rate, which is 3% of Bitcoin's (P2a). Finally, in terms of 
scalability, of the cryptocurrencies, we studied Bitcoin Cash is the PoW that shows the best 
results. It outperforms both Bitcoin and Ethereum in terms of TPS (P3a). To achieve this result, 
Bitcoin Cash loses a degree of both decentralization and security. 
B. PoS Constellations 
PoS consensus algorithm was invented by the South African Sunny King, during the late 1990s, 
before PoW was created by Nakamoto. Unlike PoW, which involves resource expenditure to 
solve a cryptographic puzzle, PoS requires participants to stake some of their tokens in order 
to become network validators (Fani et al., 2019). To prevent misbehaviour, PoS systems 
penalize any agent who tries to attack the networkE\UHPRYLQJWKHDJHQW¶VVWDNH. As anyone 
with a stake can participate in the network (P1a) and validation does not require high resource 
expenditure (because it does not involve spending energy in the mining) (P1c), PoS is 
theoretically the protocol with the highest decentralization potential. However, owing to 
existing network sizes, which are sometimes reduced, and PoS variations (e.g., votes 
delegation), its decentralization potential has not yet been fully realized. In this paper, we will 
discuss Dash, EOS, and Ardor PoS applications.  
Dash: Dash is a cryptocurrency that aims to be an untraceable, fast digital currency, using 
mainly a PoS protocol. Dash is currently mostly used in countries like Venezuela, where people 
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need to conduct transactions quickly with privacy and confidentiality due to strict government 
regulations (Dash, 2019; Baker, 2019). 
Theoretically, Dash displays permissionless roles across users and validators. However, 
while there is no need for acquiring special equipment or spending computer power, anyone 
who wants to enter the master nodes/validation network needs to pay a stake in Dash, which 
can be out of reach for most of the people (staking power) (P1c). Furthermore, governance 
decisions are not open to everyone but instead just to the masternode network through their 
voting rights (P1a). Currently, there are more than 4430 nodes (Blockchair, 2019) validating 
transactions on the Dash network, which is a relatively large validation network (P1b); 
however, the entry and voting requirements make it less decentralized than Bitcoin or 
Ethereum, for example. 
Dash displays medium resource expenditure (P2a), and 34 TPS (Dash, 2019) (P2b), which 
FRQWULEXWHVWRZDUGVLQFUHDVHGVHFXULW\+RZHYHU'DVK¶VWHFKQRORJ\LWVHOILVQRWSULYDWHEXW
instead a mix of tumblers and cryptocurrency features. This means that, if a masternode is 
attacked, user information (addresses and transaction details) could be leaked. Additionally, 
the fact that masternodes "stake" to enter the network means that a relevant percentage of 
masternodes can, in fact, be controlled by a group of colluding agents (P2c). In this sense, Dash 
is less secure than Bitcoin or Ethereum, for example. Finally, Dash block size is currently 2 
MB, and it has a TPS of 34 (Dash, 2019), making it more scalable than traditional PoW 
cryptocurrencies, but less secure.  
EOS: EOS.IO uses a blockchain architecture designed to enable vertical and horizontal scaling 
of decentralized applications, by creating an operating system-like construct upon which 
applications can be built. EOS uses Delegated Proof-of-Stake in which anyone who holds 
tokens on the platform may select one of 21 block producers through a continuous approval 
voting system (EOS.IO, 2019). 
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EOS uses a system of delegation of validation power to a few nodes inside the network 
contributes toward centralization, in this case concentrating validation in 21 nodes (Blocks.io, 
2019) (P1b). Such conditions make EOS one of the most centralized PoS networks, after Tron 
and BitcoinSV. Both the reduced number of nodes inside the validation network (P2c) and high 
TPS (4000 TPS) (P2b) contribute towards low security among PoW protocols.  However, what 
EOS loses in decentralization and security, it gains in scalability, as it is able to conduct 
millions of transactions per second (4000 TPS) (P3a), through a reduced validation network 
(EOS.IO, 2019) (P3b). 
Ardor: Ardor was created to allow businesses to use a public blockchain, developing and 
delivering blockchain technology that developers and business can implement in an easy and 
scalable manner. Ardor is a pure PoS algorithm, the first to ever be created, where any user can 
validate transactions by committing some number of NXT tokens (stake) in order to forge 
(validate) blocks (Jelurida, 2019). 
While usage and validation in Ardor are open to everyone, development is restricted to the 
Ardor team (P1a). Ardor scores low in resource expenditure (P1c), however, its validation 
network counts with 131 nodes, being relatively small (P1b) (ArdorPortal, 2019), presenting a 
medium governance decentralization, despite its potential to be highly decentralized in the 
future. In terms of security, Ardor can process around 110 TPS (Jelurida, 2019), which lags far 
behind EOS. However, Ardor is more secure than the previous cryptocurrency PoS protocols, 
simply because it is harder to coerce a far greater number of speakers to collude without voting 
rights. In addition, any attack on the network would only work if a staker possessed at least 
51% of the token supply, which is practically infeasible given that price fluctuates with demand 
(P2c). Nevertheless, Ardor, despite being less scalable, is still much more secure and 
decentralized than EOS, for example. 
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C. DBFT Constellations 
DBFT is a federated consensus, meaning that the network reaches consensus through 
agreement/voting among a number of central authority nodes. While proof-based consensus 
requires some sort of proof, may that be work (PoW) or stake (PoS), among others, federated 
consensus models rely on both reputation and authority of the nodes? Essentially, the latter 
pushes for some centralization in the coordination mechanism, as there are hierarchies between 
those who are allowed to vote on and validate new blocks and those who are using the chain 
for transaction purposes only. These federated consensus networks are not public to everyone, 
meaning that only a few permissioned nodes can participate in the consensus through voting 
(Christophi, 2019). DBFT consensus mechanisms and related variations are among the most 
scalable protocols of the cryptocurrency space (see Crain et al., 2018; Crain et al., 2017), as 
they tend to display high TPS (P3a) and small validation networks (P3b). In the following 
sections, we describe Ripple, Stellar, and NEO (see Figure 1). 
Ripple: Ripple, originally released in 2012, is a real-time gross settlement system (RTGS), 
currency exchange, and remittance network. It uses a common public shared ledger, which is 
managed and maintained by a network of independent validating nodes that can belong to 
anyone from individuals to banks. Unlike the other cryptocurrency protocols set out in this 
paper, Ripple does not use blockchain as a data infrastructure; it uses HashTree to summarize 
data into a single hash that is compared across nodes to provide consensus (Schwartz et al., 
2018; Liquid, 2018) 
In terms of governance decentralization, Ripple accepts new validators to join the network; 
however, each validator must first be vetted by the community; therefore, this role is somewhat 
permissioned (P1a). Ripple display low resource expenditure (P1c) what may have contributed 
to fairly decentralized validation network (over 1011 nodes) (XRPcharts, 2019) (P1b), making 
it a fairly decentralized BFT network despite the permissioned access to validation roles. 
30 
 
Regarding security, Ripple heavily relies on a unique node list (UNL) to censor malicious 
YDOLGDWRUV DV DQ\ YDOLGDWRU QRW LQ DQRWKHU YDOLGDWRU¶V 81/ LV LJQRUHG Validators vote on 
pending transactions, and only transactions accepted by at least 80% of validators are placed 
in the next block (Schwartz et al., 2018). Ripple, thus, display a low resource expenditure (P2a), 
a high TPS (1500 TPS) (P3a) (Schwartz et al., 2018), but a fairly large validation network (P2c) 
which make it more secure than other DBFT protocol application. On the other hand, Ripple is 
one of the most scalable projects in the cryptocurrency sphere due to its high TPS (P3a).  
Stellar: Stellar, originally released in 2014, is a real-time platform that connects banks, 
payment systems, and people, allowing cross-boundary transactions between any pair of 
currencies, either digital or fiat, at very low costs, quickly, and reliably (Mazieres, 2016). 
Stellar's SCP is essentially an improved version of a Federated Byzantine Agreement, where 
Stellar Lumens (XLM) holders can become validators or vote for validators, making it a form 
of delegated BFT (dBFT). Despite introducing right voting systems, Stellar is quite centralized 
in terms of validating nodes, sinceʊlike Rippleʊonly vetted institutions can be a part of the 
consensus (P1a). At the time of writing, Stellar has only about 70 validating nodes 
(Stellarbeat.io, 2019), scoring low on governance decentralization (P1b). As governance is 
fairly centralized (P2c) and TPS very high (between 1000 and 10,000 TPS) (P2b), security is 
inherently lower than under other protocols. On the other hand, Stellar is able to perform 
between 1000 and 10,000 TPS (Mazieres, 2016), with a confirmation time between two and 
five seconds, making it a scalable protocol (P3a), a key selling point for DBFT protocols. 
NEO: NEO is a decentralized application platform founded in 2014, with a vision to enhance 
WKH ³VPDUW HFRQRP\´ WKURXJK EORFNFKDLQ DQG VPDUW FRQWUDFWV WR LVVXH DQG PDQDJH GLJLWDO
assets. NEO develops user-friendly tools with known programming languages that allow 
developers to conceive and scale smart contracts in the NEO blockchain (NEO Whitepaper, 
2019). 
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'HVSLWH1(2¶VORZresource expenditure (as there are no transaction fees involved) (P1c), 
this cryptocurrency is one of the least decentralized of the studied cases, as NEO validators 
network is composed of a small number of centrally approved nodes (around 7) (P1b), and 
development is centralized in the NEO foundation (NEO, 2019) (P1a). Due to its very high 
TPS²1000 to 10,000²(NEO Whitepaper, 2019) (P2b) and small validation network (P2c), 
NEO display security issues. NEO losses in decentralization and security are compensated for 
by its scalability potential, as it is one of the most scalable projects presented in this paper.  
V. DISCUSSION 
In this paper, we explore governance decentralization, security, and scalability of 
cryptocurrency protocols. Our analysis of cryptocurrency protocols builds on and expands the 
CAP theorem (Brewer, 2000) that states that a decentralized storage system cannot have 
consistency, availability, and partition tolerance, all at once. Brewer's CAP theorem applies to 
distributed systems at large, and while some dimensions still apply to cryptocurrencies, others 
do not, as cryptocurrencies entangle different technologies on the top of distributed systems, 
as for example cryptography and consensus protocols, among others, which bring to the table 
different dimensions and implications for the trade-off.  
:H DOVR H[SDQG (WKHUHXP¶V VFDODELOLW\ WULOHPPD ZKLFK VWDWHV WKDW D EORFNFKDLQ FDQQRW
possess all three qualities: security, decentralization, and scalability simultaneously. While the 
scalability trilemma was developed in light of blockchain, specifically Bitcoin, and Ethereum, 
we have theorized and included other protocols, exploring the organizational and technology 
features that affect these dimensions and respective trade-offs. The organizational and 
technological variables that we theorize in this paper, not only allow mapping the general 
consensus protocols (PoW, PoS, and DBFT) alongside the three-dimensional space 
(governance decentralization, security, and scalability), but also the different protocol 
applications and variations.     
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Observing the picture of the constellations of projects implemented nowadays (see Figure 
1), it is possible to observe that the Bitcoin and Ethereum, two PoW protocols, score the highest 
in terms of security (as predicted) but also in governance decentralization. In this specific case, 
PoW protocols Bitcoin and Ethereum are secure as they display high resource expenditure 
(mainly computational power) (see P2a), lower TPS (see P2b), and large validation networks 
(P2c), which reduce the likelihood of successful perpetrated attacks. Nevertheless, they also 
score high in decentralization, due to their permissionless roles (see P1a) and large validation 
networks (see P1b). For instance, Bitcoin and Ethereum present wide networks of users, 
developers, and validators, with over 9,000 and 6,000 validating nodes, respectively (values of 
quarter 1 of 2020) (Bitcoin, 2019). Such factors explain why these Bitcoin and Ethereum 
protocols are able to reach security and decentralization simultaneously. On the other hand, 
Bitcoin Cash, which is too a PoW protocol, ranks lower insecurity, than some PoS-based 
protocols, such as Dash. The reason is the fact Bitcoin Cash has a smaller validation network, 
which may increase the likelihood of being attacked (see P2c). 
While it is possible for cryptocurrency projects to achieve security and governance 
decentralization simultaneously, it is more difficult to achieve scalability and security and/or 
governance decentralization simultaneously, considering existing technology. EOS (PoS based 
protocol) and Neo (DBFT based protocol) are such examples. While EOS displays a relatively 
high TPS (3996) (EOS.IO, 2019), it lacks decentralization and security. For instance, during 
2019 there was a known issue with EOS validators colluding to remain validators, by agreeing 
on who was going to be voted as a validator in the next voting rounds. While EOS is indeed 
secure in terms of transactions being propagated, it is vulnerable to nodes collusion and attacks 
due to the centralization of validation power, ranking low in security (see P2c). Another 
example is Neo (a delegated BFT protocol), which is able to perform between 1000 to 10000 
TPS and display a validation network of 7 nodes. Such examples show how scalability tends 
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to be achieved through small validation networks, which through enhance the chances that 
collusion behaviours and attacks occur, endangering the security of the protocol.   
Limitations and further research 
In this paper, we focused on organizational and technological features that influence 
governance decentralization, security, and scalability. However, other protocol features may 
also impact governance decentralization, security, and scalability. For example, TPS, in terms 
of block weight and time, has an impact on incentive systems of cryptocurrency protocols. As 
validators receive fees for validating transactions and in some cases, a reward for successfully 
adding a block to the chain, the level of reward and the block-time and weight will have an 
impact on their decision to be part of the network or not. Such aspect will influence the size of 
the network, and, therefore, decentralization. Other variables to consider could be tokens 
appreciation, as a higher token price means increased revenue for validators, which may attract 
more validators, increasing the validation network. Such dimensions may require further 
investigation as they entail a kind of egg-chicken problem, the size of the network increases 
because of the token appreciation, or the tokens' appreciation increase because of the increase 
of the validation network. 
There are also other dimensions that we did not explore in this paper for the sake of brevity. 
Among these dimensions, we can name fungibility, accountability, privacy, confidentiality, 
and even anonymity. Within the cryptocurrencies sphere, there are concerns over whether the 
identity of users who make transactions is revealed. Bitcoin is an example of a 
³SVHXGRQ\PRXV´FXUUHQF\ZKHUHHQFU\SWHGDFFRXQWVFDQWKHRUHWLFDOO\EHWUDFHGEDFNWRWKHLU
owners while remaining anonymous for standard practical purposes (Nakamoto, 2008). Value 
can thus be held and exchanged in cryptocurrencies without the public disclosure of personal 
identity (Dierksmeier and Seele, 2018). What are the implications of different types of privacy 
and confidentiality? How do such variants affect the protocol, transactions, and users' 
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behaviours? Under which conditions should a protocol adopt flexibility in privacy and 
confidentiality? What are the costs and benefits of not being able to trace the flow of the money 
or limiting the amount of circulating coinage? 
Nowadays, more than 4000 cryptocurrencies exist in exchanges (CoinMarketCap, 2019), 
representing a $300 billion market capitalization (Schroeder, 2019). However, we 
acknowledge that the scalability limitation denotes the current state of the technology, which 
is still in its infancy. Nevertheless, researchers shall not be demotivated by the current state of 
development but instead excited to start exploring, theorize, and test the similarities and 
differences that characterize the universe of cryptocurrencies. 
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